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tional rights of Americans, the government has found the right to
domestic tranquility, and to a peaceful and secure existence, to out-
weigh the right to procedural guarantees that do not affect the fact-
finding process.
Michelle Ward LaBorde
LOUISIANA LIGNITE-A LUMBERMAN'S LAMENT:
Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison (La. 1981)
After extensive negotiations, a vendor sold several non-
contiguous tracts of land comprising 90,000 acres to the vendee, a
timber producer, subject to a reservation of all mineral rights. The
plaintiff corporation (Continental Group) succeeded the original
vendee; the vendor corporation dissolved and distributed its remain-
ing assets among the present defendants. Continental Group sought
a declaratory judgment, asserting that each servitude created by
the mineral reservation included only the right to explore for and
exploit oil, gas, and kindred minerals and did not include the right
to strip-mine solid minerals. The parties stipulated that the ser-
vitudes had expired as to all minerals on several non-contiguous
tracts because nothing had occurred on these tracts to interrupt the
ten-year prescription of non-use. The defendants asserted that
prescription on the servitudes governing the other tracts had been
interrupted by oil or gas production and that accordingly they. were
entitled to strip-mine the lignite coal on those lands. The plaintiff
then contended that the defendants' oil and gas operations were in-
sufficient to prevent accrual of liberative prescription as to solid
minerals which require a different method of extraction from the
earth. The Louisiana Supreme Court held, on rehearing, that the
original parties' negotiations evidenced their intent to include the
right to strip-mine lignite coal in the reservation, but that this right
had prescribed by non-use notwithstanding the production of oil and
gas. Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
Generally, the use and extent of a contractual servitude must be
regulated exclusively by the written act creating it. When the terms
are clear and explicit, the servitude cannot be restricted, modified,
or limited.' Often, however, the contracts, especially those creating
1. See Delahoussaye v. Landry, 3 La. Ann. 549, 550 (1848).
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mineral reservations, contain ambiguous provisions which must be
resolved. Problems also arise in interpreting mineral reservations
because the term "minerals" is inherently ambiguous" and isdif-
ficult' to define. Other jurisidictions have held that the word
"mineral" is one of general language and not per se a term of art.'
But while the term is not definite, it is susceptibi of limitation ac-
cording to certain rules of contractual interpretation.
Several pertinent rules of interpretation are to be considered in
determining which particular mineral substances are conveyed or
reserved in a given stipulation. The primary consideration is the in-
tention of the parties at the time of the conveyance. The determina-
tion of this intent depends not only upon the language of the deed in
question, but also upon the relative position of the interested parties
and upon the substance of the transaction embodied by the deed.'
As a general rule, the interpretation most favorable to the non-
drafting party is to be adopted.7
Another rule provides that the law favors free, unrestrained use
of immovable property. Accordingly, Louisiana courts generally
have applied article 753 of the Civil Code of 1870' to favor the ser-
vient estate owners when conflicts arise as to the interpretation of
contractual servitudes between them and the servitude owners. If
all interpretations are equally reasonable, the correct interpretation
2. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison 404 So. 2d at 435; id. at 439 (Dennis, J.,
concurring); cf. id at 438 (Dixon, C.J., concurring).
3. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219, at 251-95
(1981).
4. Id
5. See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen 200 La. 917, 925, 9 So. 2d 228, 232
(1942). LA. CIv. CODE art. 1959 provides: "However general be the terms in which a
contract is couched, it extends only to the things concerning which it appears that the
parties intended to contract." See also Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d at
439 (Dennis, J., concurring).
6. See Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 200-02. 91 So.
676, 677 (1922). See also authorities cited in note 5, supra.
7. See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. at 932. 9 So. 2d at 233: See LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1958.
8. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d at 440 (Dennis, J., concur-
ring). LA. CIV. CODE art. 753 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 514, § 1), pro-
vided that: "Servitudes which tend to affect the free use of property, in case of doubt
as to their extent or the manner of using them, are always interpreted in favor of the
owner of the property to be affected." LA. CIv. CODE art. 730 states: "Doubt as to the
existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in
favor of the servient estate." See also McGuffy v. Wel, 240 La. 758, 767, 125 So. 2d
154, 158 (1960).
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is that which least restricts the ownership of the land conveyed. Xn
other words, strict construction of contractual servitudes has
become the norm.'0
Further complications arise in interpreting mineral reservations
which are not carefully drafted. Provisions such as "iron, coal, and
other minerals" or "minerals, oil and gas rights" leave open the
question of what is intended to be included in the servitude under
the generic term "minerals." The rule of ejusdem generis," often ap-
plied to such stipulations, requires that the word "minerals" be con-
strued as intending to include other minerals of a character similar
to the aforementioned ones. Thus, in Huie Hodge Lumber Company
v. Railroad Lands Company,12 the court held a reservation of the
former type ("iron, coal, and other minerals") to include only solid
minerals, and to exclude oil and gas which require drilling. In
Holloway Gravel Company v. McKowen,'3 a reservation of the lat-
ter type ("minerals, oil and gas rights") was held not to have given
the vendors a right to exploit the land for sand and gravel.
Judicial application of the rule of ejusdem generis involves other
considerations as well. The question of whether the grant" reserves
the vendor's right to strip-mine the land often is resolved by assess-
ing the impact that surface excavation of the minerals will have on
9. See Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 612, 678 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 159, 193 So. 570, 573-74 (1940).
10. See, e.g., "Contracts whereby servitudes are created, are designed to confer
rights and impose obligations, which, otherwise, would have no existence and should
be strictly construed." Shaffer v. State Nat'l Bank, 37 La. Ann. 242 (1885), quoted in
Dickson v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 193 So. 246, 249 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). Arcuri
v. Cali, 244 So. 2d 309, 311 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), states that servitudes are in
derogation of the public policy against encumbered property ownership, and the
language contained in such servitudes must be strictly construed. The language will be
given effect when it is clear and unequivocal. See also LaSalle Properties, Inc. v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co., 391 So. 2d 574, 576 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
11. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 3, at § 219.5, at 278-79 n.1 &
§ 219.6, at 290 n.4.
12. 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676.
13. 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 288.
14. The word "grant" is used here to encompass both servitudes and leases. "A
mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the pur.
pose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and
ownership." LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:21 (1974). "A mineral lease is a contract by
which the lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals." LA. MIN.
CODE: LA. R.S. 31:114 (1974). "The interest of a mineral lease is not subject to




the value of the land. 5 In River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy
Resources of Minnesota,' the court held that the lease involved did
not grant the right to strip-mine the lessor's land.17 The court noted
that even though the parties may have known that coal deposits ex-
isted when the lease was executed, no one at that time considered
the extraction of coal economically feasible. Land used for grazing
and agricultural purposes would be virtually worthless if the vendor
was allowed to strip-mine for sand gravel. 8 In fact, the strip mining
process completely eliminates the surface owner's enjoyment of the
portion of the property being mined."
Other jurisdictions, obviously cognizant of the harsh conse-
quences of strip mining on the land, have adopted the rule that, ab-
sent an express intention to the contrary, substances which may be
exploited only by strip mining techniques are not included within a
reservation or grant of minerals." In Reed v. Wylie,"' the Supreme
Court of Texas held that near surface lignite coal belongs to the
owner of the land if it is shown that any reasonable method of pro-
duction, such as strip mining, would destroy or deplete the surface.'
15. Lignite coal is found in veins of varying thickness below the surface at depths
of 25 to 200 feet. The surface depth above the vein of coal, called overburden,
must be entirely removed by powerful machines before extracting the coal for
market. This process of extraction, called strip mining, completely eliminates the
surface owner's enjoyment of the portion of the property being mined.
River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d at 878, 880
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
16. 331 So. 2d at 878.
17. Id. at 881. The River Rouge case involved a Bath Form lease which the second
circuit found to be wholly inconsistent with strip mining operations. Id. at 880.
18. See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. at 931-32, 9 So.. 2d at 233.
19. See 331 So. 2d at 880. See note 15, supra.
20. See, e.g., Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980);
Carson v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Kinder v.
LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 11. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); Besing v. Ohio Valley
Coal Co. of Kentucky, 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510 (1st Dist. 1973); Wulf v.
Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); Brady v. Smith, 73 N.E. 963, 181 N.Y. 178
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1905); Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E.
186 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1895); Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1975);
Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1981); Campbell v. Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924); Shores v. Shaffer. 206 Va. 775, 146
S.E.2d 190 (1966); Buery v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928); Puget Mill Co. v.
Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939); West Virginia Dept. of Hwys. v. Farmer,
226 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. 1976); Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick &
Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1918).
21. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1980).
22. "Unless specifically referred to, a person granting or reserving an interest in
'oil, gas, and other minerals' by lease or other conveyance would not generally have in-
1982] 1151
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The decisions of other states also evince a strong policy against con-
struing ambiguous mineral reservations to include strip mining.2
In addition to general problems of interpretation; Louisiana
courts also must contend with the difficulty of determining the ap-
plicable law governing a servitude. The determination of the ap-
propriate prescriptive period has proved particularly difficult.
Before the enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code," only the
general Civil Code articles regarding servitudes governed mineral
leases." According to the Civil Code, both the mode of servitude and
the servitude itself were subject to prescription." If the servitude
owner failed to use his right to its full extent, his servitude was
reduced accordingly." For example, in the case of Ohio Oil Company
v. Ferguson,"5 the court recognized, as it had in the landmark case of
Frost-Johnson Lumber Company v. Salting's Heirs," that mineral
servitudes should be governed by the Civil Code articles on ser-
vitudes' and consequently found that the servitude owner had exer-
cised a lesser right than that granted him by title; therefore, his ser-
vitude was reduced accordingly. Twenty years later, the court real-
tended that his surface be destroyed in order for the grantee to recover the unnamed
minerals." Id. at 745. See also Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Contra, Lazy D Grazing Ass'n v. Terry Land & Livestock Co., 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.
1981).
23. See cases cited in note 20, supra.
.24. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:1-214 (1974).
25. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:2 (1974) provides that: The provisions of this
Code are supplementary to those of the Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable
specifically to the subject matter of mineral law. In the event of conflict between
the provisions of this Code and those of the Civil Code or other laws the provi-
sions of this Code shall prevail. If this Code does not expressly or impliedly pro-
vide for a particular situation, the Civil Code or other laws are applicable.
26. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 796 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 514, § 1),
which provided:
The mode of servitude is subject to prescription as well as the servitude itself,
and in the same manner.
By mode of servitude, in this case, is understood the manner of using the ser-
vitude as is prescribed in the title.
27. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 798 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, 514, § 1),
which stated:
If, on the contrary, the owner has enjoyed a right less extensive than is given
him by his title, the servitude, whatever be its nature, is reduced to that which is
preserved by possession during the time -necessary to establish prescription.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 759, which provides that: "A partial use of the servitude con-
stitutes use of the whole."
28. 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1947).
29. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
30. 213 La. at 195-96, 34 So. 2d at 750.
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firmed this view in Trunkline Gas Company v. Steen."'
In another case,8 a transmission company's failure to construct
additional lines during the applicable ten-year period constituted a
less extensive use88 than that given the company by title. The com-
pany thus lost by prescription any rights it had to build additional
lines." Another circuit followed this reasoning in holding that a gas
company's right to lay additional pipelines had prescribed by non-
use for ten years.' Thus, under the Civil Code articles, a servitude
owner had to use his servitude in the full manner contemplated by
the grant or reservation in order to interrupt prescription and
preserve intact his right.
The Mineral Code changes this rule and provides that "lain in-
terruption of prescription applies to all types of minerals covered by
the act creating the servitude and to all modes of its use."3' But this
statute's application is limited in that no provision of the Code may
be applied to divest already vested rights.38 This prohibition is in ac-
cord with both the state and federal constitutions. Since the
acknowledged goal of the Mineral Code is to codify existing
jurisprudence, ' the Code provisions largely restate existing
jurisprudential rules. But in previously unclear or untreated areas
31. 249 La. 520, 187 So. 2d 720 (1966). The court stated that "[I]n the evolution of
the mineral law in the State, it was recognized that the sale or reservation of a
mineral right, having been classed as a servitude, was subject'to the applicable articles
of the Civil Code in the resolution of conflicting claims .... 249 La. at 535, 187 So.
2d at 725.
. 32. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Fontenot, 187 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
33. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 796 & 798 (as they appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts.
No. 514, § 1).
34. 187 So. 2d at 461.
35. Dickerson v. R.J.M. Pipeliners, Inc., 331 So. 2d 501, 503-04 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976).
36. See Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 617-18, 135 So. 1, 2
(1931). See also Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 329-30,182 So. 519, 523 (1938).
37. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40 (1974).
38. "The provisions of this Code shall apply to all mineral rights, including those
existing on the effective date hereof; but no provision may be applied to divest already
vested rights to impair the obligation of contracts." LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:214
(1974).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10: U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, §
23; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (1921). See also Day, Applicability of The New Mineral
Code to Existing Mineral Rights, in 22d ANN. INSTITUTE OF MINERAL LAW 205, 20809
(Harrell ed. 1975).
40. 1 LA. REV. STAT. ANN.-MIN. CODE, (introduction by the La. St. L. Inst.)
(West).
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of law, the application of the Code is designed to promote legal
stability by announcing a particular principle as the proper rule of
law.'1 This latter approach creates a retroactivity problem.
After the enactment of the Mineral Code, courts faced a dilem-
ma in determining disputed rights created prior to its effective date.
In GMB Gas Corporation v. Cox,'" the second circuit held that the
Mineral Code articles should govern pre-code issues which had not
been resolved clearly by the state's jurisprudence." A concurring
opinion stated that the court actually was holding the Mineral Code
to be retroactive under the guise of promoting stability." However,
if retroactive application of the Code divests vested rights, then
clearly such retroactive application is unconstitutional."
In Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison," the court directly con-
fronted the aforementioned problems of interpreting contractual
mineral servitudes and of determining whether the Civil Code or the
relatively recent Mineral Code applies to such servitudes created
before the effective date of the new legislation. The servitude at
issue was one of all mineral rights, a phrase which the supreme
court conceded was "inherently ambiguous." 7 The court also
acknowledged that the broadest definition of the term "minerals"
would encompass almost every earthen substance." Thus, the court
followed Huie Hodge Lumber Company," which allowed judicial
scrutiny of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intentions in
making the reservation. The Louisiana Supreme Court, adopting the
second circuit's analysis of the contract negotiations preceding the
reservation as determinative of the issue," held that the instant ser-
vitude included the right to strip-mine lignite coal.' The supreme
court, however, in reversing the court of appeal's holding, concluded
41. Id. See geneially Day, supra, note 39, at 209-12.
42. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
43. "To establish stability in this area of the law, the provisions of the Mineral
Code should be followed on pre-code issues which have not been clearly resolved by
the jurisprudence." Id at 640.
44. Id. at 641 (Marvin, J., concurring).
45. See authorities cited at note 39, supra.
46. 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
47. Id at 435.
48. Id
49. 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676.
50. Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 379 So. 2d 1117, 1119-20 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979), rev'd, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
51. 404 So. 2d at 435.
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that the defendant's strip mining rights had prescribed by non-use
for ten years.2
The initial issue, the interpretation of the servitude, challenged
the court to apply the general rules of construction, including the
parties' intentions, in light of the obvious public policy. The second
circuit's analysis," which was adopted by the supreme court,"
employed several construction principles, one of which provides that
all doubts arising from the language embodied in the agreement
should be construed in favor of the non-drafting party.5 The appeals
court, however, concluded that negotiations by both parties pro-
duced the ultimate language;" thus, neither party could claim the
benefit of this rule. In addition, the rule of ejusdem generis," ap-
plied in Huie Hodge" and in Holloway Gravel" to exclude the right
to minerals which require a different method of extraction from
those specifically enumerated, did not apply because no additional
terms accompanied the reservation of all mineral rights."'"
The court of appeal, in its quest to determine the parties' intent,
engaged in an exhaustive review and analysis of the circumstances
and negotiations surrounding the sale in which the servitude was
created." Originally, the plaintiff vendee's predecessor (Gair) pro-
posed the express exclusion of "earth, sand, and gravel" from the
reservation. On the other hand, the predecessor of the defendant
vendor (Mansfield) sought to maintain the broad, general scope im-
plied by the phrase all mineral rights. The vendee subsequently
agreed to leave the term unrestricted in return for a provision re-
quiring the vendor to reimburse the vendee for all damage done "to
the timber" or "to other forest products."'"
52. Id.
53. 379 So. 2d at 1123-30.
54. 404 So. 2d at 435.
55. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1958, provides:
But if the doubt or obscurity [in the agreement] arise for the want of necessary
explanation which one of the parties ought to have given, or from any other
negligence or fault of his, the construction most favorable to the other party shall
be adopted, whether he be obligor or obligee.
56. 379 So. 2d at 1124.
57. See text at note 11, supra.
58. 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676. The reservation in that case was of the right to iron,
coal, and other minerals. 151 La. at 199, 91 So. at 677.
59. 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228. The reservation there was of all the minerals, oil and
gas rights. 200 La. at 920, 9 So. 2d at 230.
60. 379 So. 2d at 1120 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 1120-24.
62. Id. at 1121-22. The reservation language reads:
"There is expressly excluded from this sale and the Vendor reserves, all
19821 1155
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Based on this trade-off by the parties, the second circuit held
that the parties intended that solid material could be extracted by
strip-mining the servitudinal lands.3 However, even if the right to
strip-mine gravel was included within the reservation, the court's
finding that the vendor reserved lignite mining rights does not
follow logically. Given the vendee's concern over the possibility of
sand and gravel operations, it is unlikely that the company would
have assented to a transaction in which the vendor could enjoy a far
more extensive right than that necessary to exploit those materials.
Further support for the plaintiff's argument is that the damage pro-
vision did not mention that the mineral owner would be liable for
damages to the land.' Certainly, such a clause would have been in-
cluded expressly if the strip-mining of lignite had been within the
contemplation of the parties..
The real issue, as presented by Continental and recognized as
such by the second circuit, was whether these parties intended at the
time of contracting that the servitude would permit the vendor to
strip-mine a solid mineral which had no economic significance until
two decades later."0 Area residents knew of the presence of lignite
coal nearby and that it could be strip-mined from the land. But at
the time the parties created the reservation in issue, this process
was not economically feasible. The court responded to this issue by
simply stating, "[tihe very word explore . . implies a venture into
the unknown or uncertain. This is in the nature ofa 'hope' which
may be sold or reserved."" On this basis, the court found the fact
that a particular mineral has no foreseeable economic value at the
time of contracting to be a.mere factor, along with many others, to
mineral rights in the lands conveyed hereunder ... with the right of ingress and
egress for the proper exploitation of the same. The Vendor . . . shall pay the
Vendee for all damage done to timber, wood or other forest products or the prop-
erty of the Vendee on the lands conveyed hereunder .. .. in connection with opera-
tions by the Vendor . . . in the course of such exploitation and shall assume the
payment of, and pay any taxes levied on the minerals produced from such opera-
tions, or the increase in the value of the land, if any, caused thereby or by the
equipment placed thereon in connection with such exploitation.
Id. at 1119 n.1.
63. Id at 1123-24.
64. See note 62, supra.
65. The trial court concluded that "had the purchaser known ... that every acre of
the timberlands acquired . ., would be subject to strip mining, .-. . it would not have
made the purchase." 379 So. 2d at 1124.
66. Id at 1129. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2451 provides: "It also happens sometimes that
an uncertain hope is sold . .
1156 [Vol. 42
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be considered in assessing the parties' intentions."
A fundamental tenet established in the jurisprudence of Loui-
siana and other states is that a substance must be commercially ex-
ploitable at the time of the agreement for it to be deemed included
in a broadly worded grant or reservation of mineral rights.6 In Huie
Hodge, oil and gas were excluded from the servitude in large part
because these substances were not known to be valuable minerals at
the time the parties made the reservation in question." In River
Rouge, the court expressly relied upon the fact that, as late as 1971,
lignite was not commercially mineable."0 Therefore, in determining
the parties' intentions,' the court of appeal failed to give proper
weight to the crucial fact that at the time of the instant contract
(1956), lignite coal was not known to be a valuable or economically
feasible mineral substance.
In addition, the court of 'appeal perceived certain arguably ir-
relevant facts regarding the plaintiff's business as pertinent. 2 Much
attention was devoted to the plaintiff's plans for harvesting timber
on a rotating basis.8 The details of Continental's restoration pro-
gram,7 ' considered conjunctively with evidence that substantial res-
67. 379 So. 2d at 1129.
68. For an excellent comment on this rule of construction generally, and on the
River Rouge case in particular, see Ellis, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1975-1976 Term-Mineral Rights, 37 LA. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1977), stating in
part:
The common result of restrictive interpretation carries an important message for
the prudent legal draftsman who seeks broad coverage-avoid generalities and be
explicit, even at the expense of using extra words; .... The legal draftsman who
wants today's contracts to cover tomorrow's still unknown resources cannot rely
upon a general phrase in a granting clause.
See also Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d at 439 (Dennis, J., concurring).
69. 151 La. at 200-02, 91 So. at 677-78.
70. "While the existence of the coal deposits may have been known when the in-
stant lease was executed, no one then considered it economically feasible' to extract it."
331 So. 2d at 881.
71. See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1945-1962.
72. See generally 379 So. 2d at 1125-27. See note 65, supra, and text at note 66,
supra. Cf. Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917,9 So. 2d 228, and River Rouge
Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minn.. 331 So. 2d 878, in each of which the court
considered the purposes for which the landowner had acquired the property in ques-
tion rather than the fact that the property owner, several years later, had granted the
right to extract gravel and lignite, respectively.
73. 379 So. 2d at 1127.
74. The court acknowledged that Continental annually harvests timber from about
1/30 of its non-contiguous tracts which comprise more than 300,000 acres in North
19821 1157
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toration of land subject to strip mining is possible within forty
years, fortified the court's position. The court concluded that Con-
tinental had abundant land possessions and that the exercise of the
defendants' alleged right to strip-mine portions of these lands would
not destroy the plaintiff's business. 
7
The court acknowledged that Continental's operations were
generally irrelevant in that the actions of a subsequent vendee
should have no bearing on the intent of the original parties to the
sale." The second circuit, however, found these actions to be one of
many factors to consider in determining whether the defendant's
right to strip-mine "would be utterly destructive, unreasonably
onerous or burdensome of Continental's rights as landowner."7' This
determination is irrelevant; no basis exists upon which to conclude
that the Holloway Gravel and River Rouge cases would have been
decided differently if the landowners in those cases had owned
substantial other lands which they could have continued to farm.
Moreover, there is certainly no requirement that the alleged extent
of the servitude operations must be "utterly destructive" to the
land before the public policy favoring the landowner in the inter-
pretation of ambiguous servitudes will apply."'
The instant case vividly illustrates two areas in which this
policy should apply. As mentioned earlier, the original parties could
not have intended, to include the right of lignite mining in their
reservation as the extraction of lignite coal was not economically
feasible at the time of the contract. 7' Additionally, strip mining
places an extremely heavy burden upon the land.0 Generally, when
all interpretations of the contractual agreement are equally
reasonable, the correct interpretation is the one which least burdens
the ownership of the conveyed lands." Thus, the courts have applied
Civil Code article 753 to create a presumption in favor of the ser-
Louisiana and South Arkansas. Continental replants these lands to allow full regrowth




78. See note 8, supra.
79. See text at note 66, supra.
80. See note 15, supra.
81. See, e.g., McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 767, 125 So. 2d 154, 158 (1960);
Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672, 678 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); LA. CiV. CODE
art. 753 (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 514, § 1); LA. CiV. CODE art. 730.
See note 9, supra.
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vient estate owner.2 Louisiana law, in rejecting the concept of
separate surface and mineral estates, has striven to restrict and
limit the mineral owner's rights in favor of the landowner. Converse-
ly, the latter's freedom to use his land should not be fettered by
lengthy and burdensome restrictions, particularly those of a nature
which were unknown and beyond the parties' contemplation at the
time they created the servitude.
The court conceded that strip mining absolutely eradicates the
surface owner's enjoyment of the portion of the property being
mined," but did not give sufficient weight to this consideration. The
Louisiana courts have recognized that the issue of surface excava-
tion is an important factor to be contemplated in construing a
mineral deed. The fact that the purchaser acquired the burdened
land in question for agricultural purposes was a primary basis for
the decision in Holloway Gravel. The Holloway court stressed that
sand and gravel were not included within the reserved mineral
rights because removal of those substances by surface excavation
would leave the purchaser with land of insignificant value."
Holloway Gravel is directly analogous to the instant situation. Gair,
plaintiff's predecessor in title, acquired the land from Mansfield for
the express purpose of growing and harvesting timber. Surely Gair
did not purchase these lands with the realization that the corpora-
tion could possibly lose the right to grow and harvest timber by
defendants' strip mining activities.
The Continental court only briefly mentioned the law regarding
strip mining in other jurisdictions, finding the common thread in all
of the cases to be the parties' intent at the time of making the
grant. " The second circuit provided an extensive list of Mineral
Code articles" in support of its conclusion that the principles of
Louisiana law are generally consistent with those of other states.87
Until recently, however, Louisiana had never experienced strip-
mining of lignite. This lack of experience in the area supports the
82. See notes 8 & 9, supra.
83. 379 So. 2d at 1125-26. The court noted River Rouge, 331 So. 2d 878. IE
84. We do not think it can be seriously contended that it was in the contemplation
of McKowen that he might at any time be deprived of the use of the land for the
purposes for which he had purchased it by the mining of sand and gravel thereon
largely for the benefit of his vendors.
200 La. at 931-32, 9 So. 2d at 233.
85. 379 So. 2d at 1127.
86. Id. at 1128. See, e.g., LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:4. 5. 11, 15. 21 & 22 (1974).
87. 379 So. 2d at 1127-28.
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proposition that the court should have afforded more consideration
to the laws of'states which have extensively litigated this issue.
The Texas rule is that near surface minerals which can be ex-
ploited by strip mining belong to the surface owner. This general
rule of construction applies in all situations where the parties have
not expressly stated a right to engage in strip mining." Other
jurisidictions have adopted a similar rule." Even in cases where the
right to a particular mineral exploitable by strip mining is conceded,
it has been held that the mineral owner:does not have the right to
engage in strip-mining of the substance absent an express, affir-
mative grant of the right to conduct such operations."0 Moreover in
his dissent from the Louisiana Supreme Court's refusal to grant
writs in River Rouge, Justice (now Chief Justice) Dixon clearly
recognized that strip mining is a separate issue once the question of
what minerals are covered by the lease is resolved." The obvious
policy underlying this rule is the judiciary's refusal to allow such a
devastating activity without clear evidence of such an intent.
The second issue raised by the facts of the case was whether the
defendants' rights to all the minerals had been reduced because only
oil and gas operations were conducted upon the burdened land. The
court of appeal followed its holding in GMB Ga8 Corporation"2 that
the Mineral Code is to be retroactively applied where the specific
is'sue has not been clearly resolved contrarily by previous litigation.
The court asserted that the prescription issue was not settled clear-
ly before the enactment of the Mineral Code because expert
witnesses disagreed as to the prior law on this point." Therefore,
the second circuit held that according to the Mineral Code,' the
defendants' oil and gas operations had interrupted prescription as to
all the minerals, including lignite.
88. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d
348 (Tex. 1971); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See also Note, Beneath
the Surface Destruction Test. The Dialectic of Intention and Policy, 56 TEX. L. REV. 99
(1977).
89. See text at note 22, supra.
90. See United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (D.C. W. Va. 1955); Franklin v.
Callicoat, 119 NE.2d 688 (Ohio C.P. 1954); Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Duricka, 97 A.2d
825 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1953).
91. 337 So. 2d at 221.
92. GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
93. 379 So. 2d at 1130.
94. Article 36 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides that: "Prescription of
nonuse is interrupted by the production of any mineral covered by the act creating the
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The supreme court on rehearing reversed the decision on the
prescription issue, and declared that Allison's right to explore for
and exploit lignite had prescribed for ten years' non-use." The court
reasoned that at the time of the Mineral Code's enactment, Con-
tinental had vested rights in the land. The Mineral Code prohibits
application of its provisions which would divest rights already
vested."
The judiciary has concluded that judicial decisions should
analyze Civil Code provisions antedating the Mineral Code, regard-
less of whether applicable jurisprudence exists on point, because the
Civil Code may vest certain rights in individuals." The court ex-
amined both the pertinent Civil Code articles" and the prior case
law interpreting these codal provisions. The supreme court
previously had applied the Civil Code in determining a mineral
owner's rights in Ohio Oil Company v. Ferguson.9 In that case, the
servitude owner's right was reduced to that which he had preserved
by his use or possession, as he had enjoyed a right less extensive
than that given him by title.'
The supreme court phrased the rule applicable to preservation
of servitudes by simply stating, "[I]f you don't use it, you lose it, and
if you don't use it well enough, you lose it;"' i.e., a servitude must
be used in the manner contemplated by the grant or reservation in
order to interrupt prescription.'10
servitude. The interruption occurs on the date on which actual production begins and
prescription commences anew from the date of cessation of actual production." Article
40 states that: "An interruption of prescription applies to all types of minerals covered
by the act creating the servitude and to all modes of its use."
95. 404 So. 2d at 435.
96. See note 37. supra.
97. Professor Ellis noted this at Ellis, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Mineral Rights, 38 LA. L. REV. 377, 378 (1978). The
court quoted from this scholarly work in response to the court of appeal's application
of its reasoning expressed in GMB Gas Corp., 340 So. 2d 638.
98. See notes 26 & 27, supra.
99. 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1947).
100. 213 La. at 252, 34 So. 2d at 769. See note 31, supra.
101. 404 So. 2d at 437.
102. The court cited Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1
(1935) and Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938). In Goldsmith, the court
followed Broussard, aupra, and found that a geophysical exploration for ascertaining
the presence of minerals beneath the surface was not use of the servitude in the man-
ner contemplated by the grant involved, and, therefore, the activity did not interrupt
prescription. See also Dickerson v. R.J.M. Pipelines, Inc., 331 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976); Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Fontenot, 187 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966).
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The litigants previously had stipulated that the defendants had
failed to use their right to explore and capture lignite. The court
thus found that the plaintiff had been in possession of this right
since 1966. Since the mode of servitude as well as the servitude
itself is subject to prescription, 3 the defendants' right to strip-mine
lignite had prescribed. Moreover, the defendants' limited activity in
drilling only for oil and gas reduced their servitude to that which
they had preserved.'"
The court's finding that the defendants' right to strip-mine
lignite had prescribed by ten years, non-use' 5 is clearly correct.
Several points regarding prescription of mineral reservations,
however, merit clarification. In addition, the new rule on prescrip-
tion'" increases the significance of interpreting mineral reserva-
tions.
Prior to the enactment of the Mineral Code in 1974, only the
rules applicable to servitudes in general"' governed the prescription
of mineral reservations."8 The prior law was properly applied in
determining the prescription issue at hand because the servitudes at
issue in the instant case were created in 1956.'" Clearly, the right to
strip-mine for lignite would have constituted a separate mode of use
under Civil Code article 796," e and a more extensive use under Civil
Code article 798"' for oil and gas drilling operations differ markedly
from the techniques employed in strip-mining coal."' Consequently,
liberative prescription of ten years applicable to such surface mining
rights accrued in 1966.
The Mineral Code, although generally considered as a codifica-
tion of prior jurisprudence, explicitly changes the law in particular
areas, including prescription." 8 However, the prior law remains ex-
103. See note 26, aupra. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40, comment at 535-36
(1974).
104. See note 27, supra See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40, comment at 535-36
(1974).
105. 404 So. 2d 435.
108. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40 (1974).
107. See note 25, aupra.
108. See notes 26 & 27. supra See Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So. 746.
109. 404 So. 2d at 436-37.
110. See note 26, supra.
111. See note 27, supra.
112. See note 15, supra See 379 So. 2d at 1125-26.
113. See generally McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under tMe
New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REv. 732 (1976). See also LA. MIN. CODE: LA.
R.S. 31:40, comment at 535-36 (1974).
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tremely important as existing mineral rights will continue for some
time to outnumber those rights created since the enactment of the
new law."' Certainly, if the servitude at issue had been created
subsequent to the enactment of the Mineral Code, then good faith
operations for oil and gas would have preserved the servitude
owner's right to conduct any subsequent surface mining activities
which originally had been granted.
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to apply Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 31:40 (which provides that an interruption of
prescription applies to all modes of use) retroactively.' At the time
the Mineral Code became effective, the plaintiff already had a
vested interest in the right to strip-mine lignite, which the defen-
dants had lost by liberative prescription of non-use for ten years.
The court of appeal in 0MB Gas Corporation justified retroactive
application of the Mineral Code on the basis that the particular issue
at bar had not been clearly resolved to the contrary. The Louisiana
Supreme Court concluded that the prescription issue in the instant
case had been sufficiently clarified1 1 so that the GMB Gas Corpora-
tion case could not be used to justify such application of the Code
under these circumstances."'
The significant import of the supreme court's adoption of the
lower court's mineral reservation interpretation in the instant case
is more clearly understood by considering it conjunctively with the
new rule"8 on prescription of these rights. If the courts allow a
reservation or grant of mineral rights to expand accordingly as new
minerals are determined profitable, then by coupling this reasoning
with Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:40, the servitude owner may
preserve his privilege to indefinite rights upon the burdened land
simply by utilizing any one of the originally reserved minerals."'
114. "What may be easy to overlook, however, is that at this particular time, and
certainly for the immediate future, existing mineral rights will far outweigh rights
created since the enactment of the Code." Day, supra note 39, at 205.
115. 404 So. 2d at 436.
116. See notes. 26 & 28, supra.
117. 404 So. 2d at 437-38. See text at note 44, aupra; see also text at note 97, supra.
118. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:40 (1974).
119. The supreme court's holding that the right to strip-mine lignite coal had
prescribed by ten years non-use will certainly preclude owners of servitudes created
before the enactment of the Mineral Code from subsequently claiming such rights. The
new legislation on prescription of mineral servitudes, however, explicitly provides that
"any use of the servitude in any mode" will prevent the accrual of prescription.
Therefore, the court's holding on the contractual interpretation issue did not circum-
vent the many foreseeable problems.
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The court's holding, in effect, creates a virtually limitless mineral
estate contrary to the view espoused in Frost-Johnson.'
0 The broad
holding presumably will allow mineral owners to search freely for
potentially valuable minerals buried in the earth. Given the
economic feasibility of extracting such substances, the servitude
owner conceivably may be permitted to remove even the soil and
subterranean water from the encumbered lands. Clearly, these
operations would render the property useless for surface uses such
as timber production.
Another consideration is whether, in light of these foreseeable
occurrences, the owner could sell the burdened land. Surely, no pro-
spective purchaser would pay him a reasonable price for the proper-
ty, nor would any financial institution accept such property as col-
lateral for a development loan. This inability of the landowner to
resell or mortgage his land effectively takes the property out of
commerce.'
21
The supreme court's proposition regarding prescription ("if you
don't use it, you lose it") may create additional problems. The court
supported this conclusion by referring to two cases which held that
failure to lay additional pipelines for a ten-year period prescribed
the right to do so."' Arguably, if these pipeline cases are analogized
to cases involving controversies over the permissible depth of oil
and gas drilling, then the right to drill at deeper depths may be
forfeited by drilling only at shallower levels for ten years or
longer.'23 This rationale would encourage, and perhaps necessitate,
servitude owners to drill at the deepest levels possible at the onset
of their operations. Such activity would result in less efficient
utilization of our scarce natural resources.""
Although the court's examination of the factual circumstances
surrounding the sale is theoretically sound, the decision necessarily
120. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (192).
121. "It is the policy of this state to maintain property in commerce." River Rouge
Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minn., 331 So. 2d at 880 (quoting from Gueno v.
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960)). See also Ellis, supra note 68, at 395,
commenting on the River Rouge case: "Perhaps the greatest merit of the decision is
that it should put land into commerce and clear titles from arrangments ill-suited to a
new resource exploitation problem. Conscious negotiation and new forms can then be
focused on problems of new resource exploitation."
122. See text at notes 34 & 36.
123. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:29 (1974).




presents adverse ramifications. Every such reservation or grant
now inevitably will require litigation to determine what the con-
cerned parties actually intended.' 9 Title searchers now must inter-
view all of the attorneys who negotiated the reservation or grant at
issue and scrutinize countless title documents in an effort to ascer-
tain which minerals the parties intended to include in their transac-
tion. Even so, no prospective buyer will be certain of exactly what
rights he is purchasing or is allowing the seller to reserve. In light
of the problems mentioned above, and the well-known fact that the
judiciary is already extensively overworked, Louisiana courts should
adopt a precise rule, similar to that of the Texas courts.' Even if
the courts do not wish to adopt the other states' rule, the better
position would be to follow the traditional approach of restricting
the servitude to what the parties could have contemplated at the
time they consummated their agreement and to those substances
which were economically exploitable at the time.' Expanding
mineral reservations to include limitless substances eventually will
leave little earth for such vital activities as farming, cattle-raising,
and timber production.
This decision should be limited to its particular facts and cir-
cumstances, ' especially to the fact that the instant reservation was
of all mineral rights. Nevertheless, persons negotiating grants or
reservations of mineral rights upon their property now must be
quite cautious in the terminology which they employ. The parties
should explicitly list the particular substances which they intend to
include within their contract. Moreover, these parties should
specifically exclude those rights which they do not wish to convey.
Despite taking these precautions, persons still may be compelled to
litigate issues concerning substances which neither party reasonably
could have contemplated at the time of contracting.
Mark Alan Lowe
125. Id
126. See text at note 22.
127. See 404 So. 2d at 439 (Dennis, J., concurring).
128. "[W]e reverse the trial court and hold that under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, a reservation of all mineral rights ...." 379 So. 2d at 1119. Justice Dennis,
in his well-reasoned concurrence, states that, "On this admittedly close issue of the
scope of the mineral reservation, the majority has declined to follow the sound and
established principles of construction because of the 'particular and unusual facts' in
this case." 404 So. 2d at 440 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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